Large digital platforms – Meta (Facebook), Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google) and Apple, the so-called Big Tech companies, which are compared to Chinese counterparts like Alibaba, JD or Tencent – dominate the world economy. Their market capitalisation has exceeded the GDP of large economies such as Germany or Japan.1 They control a significant share of global research and development (R&D)2 and patents related to frontier technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) (Fanti et al., 2022; Hötte et al., 2023). These figures reflect an unprecedented concentration of techno-economic power, with major implications for income distribution, access to knowledge and innovation, fragmentation and precarisation of labour, as well as on rising geopolitical tensions (Armoogum et al., 2022; Vasudevan, 2022).
At the root of this power is the control of knowledge, infrastructure (e.g. data centres, submarine cables) and, above all, dual-use technologies – i.e. cloud, AI, and new satellite navigation and communication systems – essential in both civilian and military spheres (Farrell & Newman, 2022; Coveri et al., 2024). Unsurprisingly, Big Tech companies are now key players in the clash between the two “digital-military-industrial complexes” (Guarascio & Pianta, 2025) – China and the United States – that are competing for global hegemony (Jia et al., 2018; Li & Qi, 2022; Rolf & Schindler, 2023). This is contributing to the blurring of the state-corporation boundaries even more than what was observed during the second half of the twentieth century with the rise of transnational corporations (Hymer, 1972; Cowling, 1982). In this respect, the ubiquitous role of Elon Musk within the new Trump Administration, or the loyalty shown by the other Big Tech CEOs during the swearing-in ceremony,3 lend support to the hypothesis of a strategic convergence of interests (O’Mara, 2020; Coveri et al., 2024).
Military and intelligence apparatuses cannot do without Big Tech. The latter control tools (among them, cloud systems or AI algorithms aimed at image and sound recognition, behaviour prediction and military targeting) that are essential for surveilling adversaries (and “allies”) and, if needed, to anticipate their moves on the battlefield. These corporations play a pivotal role in military-related innovation ecosystems, helping to mobilise the R&D efforts of start-ups and facilitating the transfer to the military sphere of technologies designed for the civilian domain (Gawer, 2022; Guarascio & Pianta, 2025). No less relevant, media platforms run by Big Tech – e.g. the social media platform X, owned by Elon Musk – are supportive in building political consensus and influencing public opinion, both at home and abroad.
On the other hand, public investments, particularly those aimed at buying and/or developing dual technologies, are a relevant source of accumulation for digital corporations; as well as a stimulus for their innovative activity (Coveri et al., 2022). Equally important may be government support when Big Tech internationalisation strategies are hampered by hostile governments and regulations (Kwet, 2019). In this context of “mutual dependence” (Coveri et al., 2024), the more intense the relationship between the state and Big Tech is, the less likely the former is to put restrictions in place – e.g. higher taxation, stricter antitrust measures or binding regulations aimed at limiting platforms’ access to private information – that would seriously challenge the economic power of the platforms.
Building on Coveri et al. (2022, 2024), we focus on the US digital-military-industrial complex highlighting and empirically documenting the channels holding the two sides together. First, we identify the main elements shaping the interdependency between the state and Big Tech. Second, we explore military expenditures and procurement contracts, showing both the progressive militarisation of digital technologies, as well as the growing importance of Big Tech as military contractors. Third, we shed light on the “revolving doors” allowing former Big Tech officers to join military and intelligence agencies, and vice versa. Fourth, we document the active role of digital corporations in current war scenarios, contributing to dismantling the “don’t be evil” rhetoric according to which Big Tech-controlled infrastructures and technologies are never used for malicious purposes.
Big Tech and the emergence of a digital-military-industrial complex
When John Hobson published Imperialism in 1902, military campaigns were crucial for opening new markets, securing the supply of raw materials and putting competitors out of business. With the consolidation of large transnational corporations, military expenditures have assumed a prominent role in sustaining capital accumulation, especially during periods of stagnation (Baran & Sweezy, 1966). Likewise, military-related R&D and procurement turn out to be important drivers of technology transfer, particularly for the development of radical innovations such as the Internet (Mowery, 2009). In the US, the linkage between military R&D agencies (e.g. the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA) and large private contractors is at the core of the “military-industrial complex”, which was instrumental to the country’s economic and technological growth during the Cold War (Galbraith, 2007).
The military sector is thus a domain where state-corporation boundaries may become significantly blurred (Pianta, 1989; Foster & McChesney, 2014; Roland, 2021). With the digitalisation of the world economy, this overlap becomes even stronger. Controlling digital networks and the “chokepoints” through which information flows from one continent to another allows for “weaponizing interdependencies” (Farrell & Newman, 2022), providing a substantial advantage over enemies and allies alike. Yet, this is virtually impossible without the support of Big Tech, as the latter controls knowledge (Rikap, 2024), technologies, such as cloud systems and AI (Van der Vlist et al., 2024), and physical infrastructures, e.g. data centres and submarine cables (Gjesvik, 2023), without which global networks can hardly be weaponised. No less relevant, contemporary wars are becoming increasingly “digital” (Merrin & Hoskins, 2020). AI-powered drones sold for less than US $100,000 can easily destroy aircrafts or tanks that are 100 times more expensive. Advanced cloud and satellite communications systems are essential for gathering information and preventing or executing attacks (physical and cyber). Even the performance of traditional weapons (e.g. aircrafts, tanks, anti-aircraft systems) is highly dependent on their digital components (Johnson, 2019; González, 2023; Zikusoka, 2024).
The digital-military-industrial complex is fairly different from the entanglement of public and private interests denounced by President Eisenhower in 1961, when the military-industrial complex was first defined. In the latter, traditional contractors (e.g. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Halliburton) were largely dependent on public demand and their innovative activity was closely linked to the needs of the military sector (Guarascio & Pianta, 2025). Accordingly, procurement relationships were (and to a good extent still are) characterised by large, long-term contracts; a strong focus on the performance of weapon systems (while less attention was devoted to efficiency or flexibility of use); and a high degree of bureaucratisation of processes (Pianta, 1989). This has biased technological trajectories and, in some cases, weakened the industry’s ability to innovate (Kaldor, 1990). The digital-military-industrial complex operates in a rather different way. Despite owing their birth to a military project (the Internet), Big Tech earn most of their profits in the civilian domain; and a majoritarian share of the technologies that they develop for the military sector stem from applications initially designed for commercial purposes. This gives them greater bargaining power vis-à-vis government procurers, consolidating their role as exclusive providers of dual technologies and, more broadly, reducing the risk of being challenged by hostile regulations.
The interdependency between the state and Big Tech
First of all, there is an original linkage. As argued, the economic power of Big Tech stems from the appropriation of knowledge and technologies developed in the public (mostly military) sector and transferred at virtually no cost by the same governmental apparatuses that helped develop them (Mazzucato, 2013).4 First movers, including soon-to-be Big Tech, have begun to push forward the technological frontier, introducing thousands of radical and incremental innovations, designed primarily for commercial use. Although their growth takes place mainly in the civil-commercial sphere, the original linkage between Big Tech and the military apparatus never completely disappears. After the Twin Towers attack on 11 September 2001, US military and counter-terrorism policy recognised the value of digital infrastructures and technologies. As a result, Big Tech has been increasingly involved in intelligence- and military-related projects, including surveillance systems, secure communications and remote management of weapons and military equipment. The dual nature of applications designed, for instance to predict consumer behaviour (Zuboff, 2019) or optimise the functioning of logistics systems, is beginning to emerge (González, 2023).
At the same time, skills and competences stemming from the public sector are a crucial source of knowledge to develop Big Tech’s R&D projects (Rikap & Lundvall, 2022). On the demand-side, the Department of Defense (DoD) budget for digital technologies kept growing. In the fiscal year 2024 budget, DoD requested US $315 billion for weapon systems acquisition, an increase from US $276 billion in 2023. This includes US $170 billion for procurement and US $145 billion for research, development, test and evaluation (R&DTE). Digital technologies play a central role in R&DTE efforts, with significant funding increases for cyberspace, spectrum, AI, 5G, and other digital-related programmes (Coveri et al., 2024). Moreover, investment in command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) – a field heavily reliant on digital technologies – has experienced the fastest growth among DoD budget components. Funding increased from US $7.4 billion in 2017 to US $12.8 billion in 2023 and is projected to reach US $21 billion in 2025.5 This budget covers command centres, data processing, IT infrastructure, communication systems, air traffic control, night vision equipment and cyberspace operations. Additionally, science and technology (S&T) activities will receive US $18 billion in 2025, with priorities focusing on AI and machine learning applications, 5G, microelectronics, quantum sciences, cyberwarfare, hyper-sonics, directed energy weapons (such as lasers and particle beams), biotechnology and space technologies.
Regarding military-related procurement contracts awarded to Big Tech, we showed how the former increased about thirteenfold from 2008 to 2024. To illustrate, Figure 1 reports the value of contracts awarded to Big Tech, highlighting the share of resources stemming from the DoD.
